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DEVELOPING CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES:
A LEGAL AND POLICY ANALYSIS
Lewis D. Solomon*
and
Suzanne E. Schoch**
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of critical technologies in the United States first
emerged as a way to guard scientific knowledge about technology to
protect national security.1 The National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 19892 included requirements for a critical tech-
nologies plan to develop the technologies most essential to ensure
superiority of United States weapons systems.3 Since then, the criti-
cal technologies concept has expanded. Ensuring national security
includes not only defense leadership but also commercial prosper-
ity. Advancement of critical technologies creates new industries
and generates jobs leading to increased economic growth and im-
proved global competitiveness of the United States.
Technological advancement requires basic research undertaken
to gain knowledge and understanding of the fundamental aspects of
the universe. The difficulty of investing in basic research for private
industry is threefold: it is long-term; the results are not always mar-
ketable; and the rewards may not be evident.4
Applied research and development are also crucial for technol-
ogy advancement. A goal of applied research is "to provide techno-
logical solutions to identified problems." 5 "Development is the
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1. The Initial Military Critical Technologies List, 45 Fed. Reg. 65,014 (1980), merely
listed exports believed to threaten national security. Kenneth Propp, Note, Export Controls:
Restrictions on the Export of Critical Technologies, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 411, 411 (1981).
2. National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-456, 102
Stat. 1918 (1988).
3. Id. 102 Stat. at 2018 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 2368 (1988)).
4. Wendy H. Schacht, Technological Advancement and US. Industrial Competitive-
ness, CONG. Rs. SERVICE R.P., Oct. 28, 1988, at 5.
5. Id.
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process of taking the results of research and using them to generate
... commercially viable technolog[ies]." 6 The last stage of techno-
logical development is the commercialization of the new products
and processes. It is here that U.S. companies need to succeed,
where technology arguably has the "'greatest economic impacts in
terms of productivity, growth, and competitiveness.' "I
This article focuses on the commercialization of innovative
critical technology. It examines U.S. technology policy including
research and development (R&D) funding, macroeconomic influ-
ences and recent federal initiatives. In looking to the future, the
free market advocates, private sector competitiveness groups, and
government agencies will all vie for the lead role in directing the
technology competitiveness of the United States.
II. U.S. TECHNOLOGY POLICY
"The goal of U.S. technology policy is to make the best use of
technology in achieving the national goals of improved quality of
life for all Americans, continued economic growth, and national se-
curity."8 U.S. policy excludes U.S. technology pre-eminence as part
of its goals. In implementing this policy, the Federal Government
maintains that all parts of the economy, including federal, state, and
local governments, industry and academia have roles to play.9 In
addition, U.S. technology policy provides that the U.S. system of
free enterprise should not be tampered with, nor should U.S. policy
favor one industry over another.10 Yet, the federal government
wields power that interferes with free enterprise.
The U.S. government spends large amounts of money funding
research and development. Such funding aids those private busi-
nesses that are able to commercialize this basic research.
Macroeconomic policy such as tax policy indirectly influences the
success of certain industries. Similarly, the lack of coordination of a
technology policy among the various departments and agencies of
government has an indirect effect on technological advancement in
the private sector.
In the post-World War II era, the framework for the U.S. gov-
ernment's support for science and technology can be traced to Van-
6. Id.
7. Id. at 6 (citing John M. Marcum, Technology Leadership: Co-operation, Competi.
tion, and Interdependency, SCI. AND PUB. POL'Y, Dec. 1985, at 319).
8. OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, U.S. TECHNOLOGY POLICY 2 (1990).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1-2.
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nevar Bush's report "Science, the Endless Frontier."'1 The report
argued that science could yield an infinite stream of benefits to soci-
ety.12 The report concluded that support for science and technol-
ogy is an appropriate role for the government, but that the applied
or developmental aspect should be left to private industry. 13
Traditionally, U.S. government support of science and technol-
ogy focused on basic research and the application and development
of technology to meet the needs of specific national missions, such
as defense, health, and space exploration. 4 The thrust for federally
funding basic research is premised on the assumption that private
industry will underinvest in basic research because of industry's in-
ability to capture all of its benefits. 1 Due to basic research's signifi-
cant long term potential benefits to the economy and society,
policymakers have deemed it necessary and proper for the govern-
ment to strongly support and federally fund basic research.' 6
Industries have relied on revolutionary breakthroughs and in-
novations based upon discoveries and advances derived from basic
research. The typical innovation process in the U.S. has begun with
a major scientific breakthrough, progressed through design, devel-
opment and production, and ended with marketplace distribution.'7
The U.S. excelled in this method of innovation and achieved preem-
inence in science and technology in the post-World War II era.',
In the 1980s, a shift occurred in three aspects of the United
States' science and technology policy. First, changes occurred in
the organization and funding of civilian research programs in an
attempt to "improve the ability of U.S. firms to realize the commer-
cial profits from the innovations spawned by such research."' 9 Sec-
ond, defense research funding began to be used "to support
advances in civilian technologies in order to [promote] eventual
technological improvements for the military."2 ° Third, "the new
11. VANNEVAR BUSH, SCIENCE, THE ENDLESS FRONTIER: A REPORT TO THE PRESI-
DENT ON A PROGRAM FOR POSTWAR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH (1945).
12. See id. at 5, 10-11.
13. Id. at 22.
14. COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, GAINING NEW GROUND: TECHNOLOGY PRIORI-
TIES FOR AMERICA'S FUTURE 13 (1991).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, PICKING UP THE PACE: THE COMMERCIAL
CHALLENGE TO AMERICAN INNOVATION 10 (1988).
18. Id.
19. David C. Mowery & Nathan Rosenberg, New Developments in U.S. Technology Pol-
icy: Implications for Competitiveness and International Trade Policy, CAL. MGMT. REV., Fall
1989, at 107, 107.
20. Id.
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science and technology policy priorities of the U.S. government and
the increased salience of these issues for foreign governments have
elevated the importance of science and technology issues within
trade policy."21 Some fear that these shifts could have a "chilling
effect on the international scientific and engineering cooperation
and communication," and that policies are being proposed "with
little apparent recognition of their implications for other foreign
and domestic policy goals."22
At the present time, the U.S. government does not have a for-
mal delineated national policy for innovation and high technology
development. The United States appears to be the only major in-
dustrialized country that does not have a national policy in this
area, although the federal government does have certain technology
programs. An ad hoc, uncoordinated approach may be unwise,
however, since the relationship between government and industry is
one of the most significant factors affecting innovation and the envi-
ronment where technological development occurs. The absence of
cooperation can be detrimental to the long-term economic health of
the U.S. as it faces increasing competition from foreign companies
where close government-industry collaboration is the norm, not the
exception.23
A. Federal Funding of Research and Development (R&D)
Federal funding of R&D is extremely critical for U.S. eco-
nomic stability and strength because the commercial marketplace
has failed to channel enough resources into R&D. The U.S. high
technology industries have tended to underinvest in R&D because
they cannot capture all the benefits from their investments. Most
private industry R&D goes to projects that are highly likely to bring
short term success, while the long term research projects are ne-
glected although they may be worth more to the nation as a whole.
Therefore federal funding needs not only to increase its aggregate
level of spending, but also shift it toward long term projects in
which social returns may exceed private ones.24
Government funding of R&D can be broken down into two
main components: defense and non-defense. In 1980, "[flederal
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Wendy H. Schacht, Industrial Innovation: Debate Over Government Policy, CONG.
REP. SERVICE ISSUE BRIEF, August 2, 1991, at 4-5.
24. UNITED STATES CONGRESS BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR
HIGH TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES 2 (1985).
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R&D spending was evenly divided between defense and non-de-
fense."25 By 1990, federal defense R&D expenditures reached 61%
of federal R&D spending, while non-defense R&D expenditures
plummeted to 39%.26 Comparing federal R&D funding of defense
and civilian sectors provides a stark contrast. Of civilian R&D
funding in 1990, basic research comprised 45%, development 27%
and applied research 29%. Of defense R&D funding in 1990, 2%
was used for basic research, 90% for development, and 8% for ap-
plied research. 27
A significant distinction now exists between defense and non-
defense R&D. In the past, defense related R&D has benefitted U.S.
private sector commercial technological capabilities.2  Research
derived from defense-related R&D could be "spun off" to create
commercially marketable products.29 Examples of defense related
spinoffs include commercial jet airplanes and computers.
Current evidence shows that spinoffs associated with defense-
related R&D are no longer widespread. 30 The research necessary to
develop defense equipment differs widely from the research needed
for civilian products.31 For example, the research involved in the
development of the B-2 Stealth bomber is not compatible with the
needs of Boeing in developing a new jet or improving an old jet.
Furthermore, the evidence indicates that the commercial sec-
tor will drive future strategic technologies. 32 Today's leading-edge
technology in microelectronics, computers, and telecommunica-
tions is found in the private sector.33 Yet, federal R&D spending
continues to favor defense R&D expenditures over the increasingly
more important non-defense R&D expenditures.34
One federal agency that has engaged in both defense and non-
defense oriented R&D is the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency or DARPA.35 Originally named ARPA, it was created as a
25. Michael E. Davey, Science and the Budget: 1990 Update, CONG. RES. SERVICE
REV., July-August 1990, at 37, 37.
26. COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 14, at 15.
27. Michael E. Davey, Research and Development Funding: FY1990, CONG. RES. SER-
VICE ISSUE BRIEF, Jan. 2, 1990.
28. Davey, supra note 25, at 37.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 14, at 20.
33. Id.
34. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
35. Marc S. Miller, The Government's Guiding Hand, TECH. REV., Feb.-March 1991,
at 35, 35.
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small office in the Pentagon in response to the Soviet launching of
Sputnik.36 After the National Air and Space Administration
(NASA) took over the space program, DARPA became the "tech-
nology mission agency" involved in R&D since it gave out military
contracts in civilian science and engineering. 7
This small, "little-known band of maverick scientists and engi-
neers" are officially charged with preventing technology surprises
from abroad and dealing with them when they occur.38 They do
this by "advancing seed money and nurturing promising research at
universities, national laboratories and leading edge industries."3 9
By funding the exploration of the outer limits of technology,
DARPA has been credited with the creation of the field of com-
puter science in the United States.4
DARPA acts independently from the armed services R&D
communities and apart from the national laboratories, thereby elim-
inating the bureaucratic layers.41 It has not confined itself to acting
within the dominating paradigm of minimal government involve-
ment in commercial technologies, but instead has focused on the
technologies, whether military or commercial, that it has seen as
necessary for the future competitiveness of the United States.
DARPA has operated on the assumption that national defense
means both developing new weapons and supporting basic research
in commercial technologies.42 This became easier when Congress, in
November of 1989 expanded DARPA's authority to allow it to pro-
vide venture capital to private companies.43
DARPA quickly became active using its new authority to sup-
port research in areas such as high-definition television (HDTV),
superconductivity, and artificial intelligence.' As the free market
debate intensified, the proponents of government intervention
sought to use DARPA to guide national high technology industries.
This has made DARPA the "lightning rod" in the storm of "debate
about the role of long-term defense research in an era of lessening
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. James Kitfield, Walking a High-Tech Tightrope, GOV'T EXECUTIVE, May 1990, at
22, 22.
39. Id. at 23.
40. John Markoff, Making Industrial Policy at the Pentagon, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19,
1989, at § 4, 4.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Industrial Policy; Beheaded, THE ECONOMIST NEWSPAPER, April 28, 1990, at 27,
27.
44. Id.
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military tensions" and "the future of U.S. high tech[nology] com-
petitiveness.""a DARPA's "industrial policy" has been extremely
successful at doing what the free market purists said would not
work; it was meddling in the private sector as a high tech venture
capitalist and getting results. With the controversial firing of the
Director of DARPA, Craig Fields, an industrial policy advocate, in
May of 1990, outsiders think the agency will return to funding spe-
cific military projects.46
Although the United States spends more in absolute terms on
R&D, U.S. non-defense R&D, which is more important than de-
fense R&D for economic competitiveness, has failed to keep pace
with that of other industrialized countries.4 7 For example, Japan
spends approximately 50% more on non-defense R&D as a percent-
age of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) than the United States.4"
Furthermore, the United States non-defense R&D expenditures are
growing at a slower pace in comparison to Japan and other industri-
alized countries.49 While the other countries have increased their
non-defense expenditures by approximately 50% since 1972, the
United States has only slightly increased the percentage of Gross
National Product (GNP) spent on non-defense R&D. 0
Also, as a percentage of total federal and private spending in
non-defense R&D, federal spending has dropped sharply in recent
decades.5' From 1970 to 1990, federal funding dropped from 31%
of total U.S. public sector expenditures in non-defense R&D to only
17% of the total.5 2
The United States spends a large portion of its non-defense
R&D budget on "big science" projects such as the space station, the
superconducting super collider 3 and the Strategic Defense Initia-
tive (Star Wars). Major increases in funding for these "big science"
projects continue to be sought at the expense of other smaller
projects that could develop commercially applicable technology. 4
In 1990, estimates indicated that in the coming decade, all "big sci-
ence" projects planned by the federal government will require over
45. Kitfield, supra note 38, at 23.
46. Evelyn Richards, Uncle Sam as a Venture Capitalist, WASH. POST, April 29, 1990,
at HI, H5.
47. COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 14, at 15.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 14, at 15.
53. Davey, supra note 25, at 38.
54. See id.
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$60 billion to complete and another $100 billion to operate and
maintain."5 Critics of these projects assert that the financial com-
mitment required to complete these "big science" projects will seri-
ously jeopardize federal R&D spending in the future, thereby
limiting the country's ability to respond to future technological
challenges.5 6
In the post-World War II era, policy makers proceeded on the
assumption that funding basic scientific research adequately pro-
vides a foundation for technological development and commerciali-
zation. Unfortunately, basic research, without more, often is
insufficient in leading commercially viable technology. According
to the National Science Foundation (NSF), the U.S. targets less
than 1% of federal R&D funding at improving our commercial de-
velopment capabilities." In contrast, Japan spends 4.8% of govern-
ment R&D funds to advance its commercial capabilities."8
In Congressional appropriations for fiscal year 1991, the DoD
funding level for R&D decreased from $36.7 billion to $36 billion
although an increase of $1.4 billion was requested. 9 The unwilling-
ness of the U.S. to fund more non-defense R&D, generally, and de-
velopmental research, specifically, may lie at the heart of why the
U.S. has lost much of its technologic and economic preeminence in
the past several decades.
B. US. Macroeconomic Policy and Government Structure
Governmental organization and procedures have a significant
impact on the effective development of commercially viable technol-
ogy.' Lack of coordination and inability to implement policies can
undermine the best technology policies.6" No one federal agency
exists that has broad responsibility for the research and other neces-
sary activities related to the private sector technology or for the
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Davey, supra note 25, at 38; see also, COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note
14, at 13.
59. See Michael E. Davey, Research and Development Funding: FY1991, CONG. RES.
SERVICE ISSUE BRIEF, Jan. 14, 1991, at 7. DARPA's funding however, was increased 14%
to $1.4 billion in FY '91. Id. at 6. Within the DOC, the NIST R&D budget increased from
$164 million in FY '90 to $215 million in FY '91. Id. at 15. Within the 1991 funding, $35.9
million was appropriated for the ATP and $11.9 million for the Centers for Transfer of Man-
ufacturing Technology. Id. at 13.
60. COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 17, at 26.
61. Id.
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strategic coordination of technology policy at the national level.62
Only the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
(the Office) provides an overview of R&D and other activities re-
lated to economic performance.63 However, the Office fumctions
primarily as an advisory body to the President.6" The Office has a
small budget and its staff consists primarily of personnel on tempo-
rary loan from other agencies.65
The Department of Commerce (DoC) operates the only federal
laboratory explicitly charged with serving the needs of U.S. indus-
try;66 [it was originally named the National Bureau of Standards,
and is now called the National Institute of Standards and Technol-
ogy (NIST)]. The small office of Productivity, Technology and In-
novation within NIST works to create a climate favorable for
innovation and technology, and its National Technical Information
Service serves as a resource for the private sector to receive scientific
and technical information. 67 The NIST also administers the Ad-
vanced Technology Program (ATP).68 The purpose of the ATP is
to assist U.S. businesses in creating and applying generic technology
and research results.69 The money is provided in the form of
matching funds for small companies or consortiums. 70 Yet this ef-
fort to fund the cutting edge technologies has only been appropri-
ated $10 million in fiscal year 1991, although the budget is likely to
increase if the Program maintains its role of development of generic
technologies through the pre-competitive phase.71
The National Science Foundation (NSF) has the responsibility
to support education, transfer research and information, as well as
to serve as the general science and engineering agency of the federal
government. Federal R&D spending by the NSF is slowly increas-
ing. Its budget was $2.1 billion in 1990 and $2.3 billion in 1991.72
In short, the United States currently lacks the necessary gov-
ernmental organization to effectively create and implement strategic
technology policy on a national scale. Poor coordination, lack of
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 17, at 27.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Elizabeth Corcoran, Talking Policy; The Administration Devises An Industrial Pol-
icy-Sort Of, Sci. AM., June 1990, at 82, 82.
69. See id.
70. Id.
71. See id. at 82, 84.
72. Davey, supra note 59, at 9-10.
1993]
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGYL4W JOURNL [
power, and inadequate funding are among the major problems that
prevent the federal agencies from effectively promoting the com-
mercialization of technology.
C. Recent Federal Initiatives
In the 1980s the federal government recognized the impact of
technology development on the competitiveness of the American
economy. The federal government began to promote policies and
programs designed to address the issue. During the 1980s, the U.S.
government launched several significant technology initiatives in-
cluding: (1) support for technological innovation; (2) tax credit for
R&D expenditures; (3) revisions of U.S. antitrust laws; (4) enact-
ment of and support for the Semiconductor Manufacturing Tech-
nology Proposal (SEMATECH); and (5) other miscellaneous
technology policy initiatives.
First, the decade began with legislation to promote the transfer
of technology from federal laboratories to the private sector. In
1980, Congress passed the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innova-
tion Act7" (1980 Act) which emphasized broad support of techno-
logical innovation.7 4 The 1980 Act mandates a government-wide
program for the transfer of technology from the federal laboratories
to the private sector and authorized a network of centers for indus-
trial technology.75 Unfortunately, the federal government never
fully implemented the 1980 Act, largely due to lack of adequate
funding.
In 1986, Congress passed the Federal Technology Transfer
Act,7 6 known as the Stevenson-Wydler Amendments. The 1986
Amendments essentially reaffirmed the 1980 Act and strengthened
some of its provisions. The 1980 Act required each of the nation's
more than seven hundred federal laboratories to establish an Office
of Research and Technology Applications which would be responsi-
ble for technology transfers from the federal laboratories to the pri-
vate sector.77 The 1980 Act also required each laboratory to
participate in the Federal Laboratory Consortium, which "operates
73. Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-480, 94
Stat. 2311 (1980) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C §§ 3701-15 (1988)).
74. Id.
75. Id. at § 6 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C § 3705 (1988)).
76. Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-502, 100 Stat. 1785
(1986).
77. Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 § 11 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. § 3710 (1988)); see also John H. Moore, Innovation, Technology and Knowledge
Transfers, East and West, 32 EUR. ECON. RaV., 591, 594.
Vol. 9
DEVELOPING CRITICIL TECHNOLOGIES
as an information clearinghouse for Federal laboratories and poten-
tial technology users."" The 1986 Amendments expanded the Fed-
eral Laboratory Consortium to include all federally owned and
financed laboratories.79
Second, Congress used the Internal Revenue Code to promote
technological innovation. In 1981, the Economic Recovery Tax
Act"0 was enacted in which Congress created a temporary 25% tax
credit for R&D expenditures in excess of the firm's expenditures in
the base period, which generally encompassed the firm's previous
three years." The Act also contained a sunset provision under
which the credit would expire at the end of 1985,82 the credit how-
ever has been extended.
Congress intended the tax credit to encourage the private sec-
tor to increase its R&D spending. However, evidence tends to indi-
cate that the tax credit did little to increase private sector R&D
expenditure.3 R&D tax credits may have raised R&D expendi-
tures as little as 1%.84 The reason for the small impact of the tax
credit on R&D expenditures may be due to the restrictive nature of
the "base amount" used in calculating the tax credit.8 5
Congress further diminished the effectiveness of the R&D tax
credit by cutting the amount of the credit from 25% to 20% in the
Tax Reform Act of 1986.86 Furthermore, by reducing the R&D tax
credit, Congress demonstrated to the private sector that the tax in-
centive could not be relied upon and could be reduced or discarded
by Congress on short notice. However, R&D is inherently a long
term investment, and firms must engage in advance R&D planning
in order to use it successfully.
Changes in the method by which the credit is calculated oc-
curred in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989.87 The
78. Moore, supra note 77, at 594; see also Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation
Act of 1980 § 11 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 3710 (1988)).
79. Moore, supra note 77, at 594.
80. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981).
81. Id. § 221, 95 Stat. at 241. See also Edwin Mansfield, The R&D Tax Credit and
Other Technology Policy Issues, (Papers and Proceedings of the 98th Annual Meeting of the
American Economic Association) 76 THE AM. ECON. REV., No. 2, at 190, 190 (1986).
82. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 § 221, 95 Stat. at 247.
83. See Mansfield, supra note 81, at 190.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 191.
86. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 231(c), 100 Stat. 2085, 2175 (1986)
(codified as amended at IRC § 41 (1988)).
87. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 7110, 103 Stat.
2106, 2322-26 (1989); see also David L. Brumbaugh, The Research and Experimentation Tax
Credit, CONG. REs. SERVICE ISSUE BRIEF, May 9, 1991, at 4.
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changes focused on the base amount which was designed to improve
the incentive effect of the credit. 8 An additional change extended
"credit eligibility to R&D related to a firm's prospective line of
business."89 The fiscal year 1992 budget includes a proposal to
make the R&D tax credit permanent at its current 20% rate,90
although at the present time, the uncertainty of the tax credit's fu-
ture inhibits its use by the private sector.
Third, antitrust laws have traditionally served to encourage in-
novative behavior, but they have also engendered hesitancy on the
part of business to engage in joint research and development ven-
tures that would permit the most efficient use of human and capital
resources. In the past, even the threat of antitrust action would
likely have ended any joint R&D project. Congress enacted the Na-
tional Cooperative Research Act91 in 1984 to remedy this situation.
The law takes the approach that joint research ventures are not to
be judged illegal "per se."92 Rather, each venture is judged on a
reasonableness basis, taking into account all relevant factors affect-
ing competition.93 The 1984 Act also eliminates treble damages
awards for joint research ventures found in violation of the antitrust
laws94 if prior disclosure has been made to the Department of Jus-
tice and the Federal Trade Commission." The law explicitly ex-
cludes production activities in order to maintain compliance with
the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts.96
Despite these changes, firms are still wary of being involved in
joint activities for fear of unknown consequences which may arise if
the government decides that the joint ventures engage in produc-
tion, as opposed to research activities. The U.S. Office of Technol-
ogy Assessment has stated:
Whether modifying the antitrust laws or their enforcement
would unleash a great deal of cooperative work, and whether
such changes would substantially improve manufacturing com-
petitiveness, is unknown .... Changes in antitrust law and en-
88. Brumbaugh, supra note 87, at 4.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. National Cooperative Research Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-462, 98 Stat. 1815
(1984) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-05 (1988)).
92. Schacht, supra note 23, at 9; see also National Cooperative Research Act of 1984
§ 4302.
93. National Cooperative Research Act of 1984 § 4302.
94. Id. at § 4303.
95. Id. at § 4305.
96. S. REP. NO. 427, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess. 12-13 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.A.N
3105, 3109.
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forcement should be made cautiously, but they deserve serious
consideration.9
7
The semiconductor companies that need collective action in or-
der to compete with the Japanese are particularly concerned with
the antitrust aspects of joint ventures. These cutting edge compa-
nies wish to band together to manufacture memory chips, but this
would still violate the antitrust laws.
The newest answer is the proposed National Cooperative Pro-
duction Act which goes farther than the National Cooperative Re-
search Act of 1984 since it allows for joint production of
innovations among companies.9 8 This bill has two key provisions:
(1) "[ilt would relieve government sanctioned joint ventures from
treble-damage phobia;" and (2) it would incorporate into law court
decisions that "cast a warmer eye on joint-production accords." 99
However, a dispute over the exclusion of co-production ventures
with more than 30% foreign ownership has delayed passage of the
bill.1  The problem with this restriction is that often it is the for-
eign firms that not only have the technology, but also the capital
needed to ensure the success of a venture. 101 The main beneficiaries
of this bill would be the high technology industries that spawn the
critical innovations."0 2
Fourth, in 1987, Congress enacted the Semiconductor Manu-
facturing Technology, or SEMATECH, initiative "to assist its U.S.
member companies to develop new processes for semiconductor
manufacturing."1 0 3 The initial impetus for the SEMATECH pro-
posal was provided by a DoD Defense Science Board study, Report
of Defense Science Board Task Force on Defense Semiconductor De-
pendency."m The report highlighted the increasing foreign control
of the semiconductor market and ramifications for the U.S. military
if the primary source of this technology was foreign.105 The study
provided two justifications for a federal government role in the
97. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. Congress, Making Things Better:
Competing in Manufacturing 30 (1990).
98. Paul Magnusson, The Antitrust Ball and Chain Hobbling High Tech, Bus. WK.,
July 29, 1991, at 34, 34.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See id.
103. Glenn J. McLoughlin, SEMATECH: The Semiconductor Manufacturing Technol-
ogy Initiative, CONG. RES. SERVICE REP., Feb. 7, 1991 at 1.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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manufacturing of commercial semiconductor chips. 10 6
First, the pressure of rapid technological innovation and short
product life cycles had worked "against longer-term R&D for next
generation manufacturing equipment."' 1 7  The government,
through DARPA, would be able to provide the industry with the
funding stability necessary for long term growth. 08 Second, the
study recognized that semiconductor technologies are a vital ele-
ment of the U.S. electronics industry, and the demise of these tech-
nologies could undermine a significant part of the entire U.S.
electronics industry."°9
Legislation to fund SEMATECH was included in the Defense
Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 1988110 which calls for joint
federal-industry funding of $100 million each year through 1992.111
Fourteen U.S. companies became charter members of SEMATECH
while federal management responsibilities fell to DARPA which
acts as the "silent" fifteenth partner.112
Most assessments of SEMATECH have been positive, but the
idea of consortia has not been without critics. Consortia have often
failed due to seven generic problems: recruiting personnel, obtaining
resources, obtaining new partners, confused decision making, com-
plex legal issues, membership turnover, and evaluating and produc-
ing outputs." 13 SEMATECH has managed to avoid these problems
and build a clean room and chip fabrication line in only thirty-two
weeks, an impressive accomplishment. 1 4
Federal funding for SEMATECH is about to run dry. SE-
MATECH II has been proposed as a "second five-year plan that
will broaden SEMATECH's mission and its role within the U.S.
semiconductor industry.""' 5 The federal role in this second project
is still unclear, although it is certain some federal support will be
requested by the consortium." 16
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. McLoughlin, supra note 103, at 1.
109. Id. at 1-2.
110. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No.
100-180, 101 Stat. 1019 (1987).
111. Glenn J. McLoughlin, Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology Proposal: SE-
MA TECH, CONG. RES. SERVICE ISSUE BRIEF, Dec. 19, 1991, at 4; see also 15 U.S.C. § 4602
(1988).
112. McLoughlin, supra note 111, at 4.
113. William M. Evan & Paul Olk, R&D Consortia: A New U.S. Organizational Form,
SLOAN MGmT. REV., Spring 1990, at 37, 41.
114. Lee Smith, Can Consortiums Defeat Japan?, FORTUNE, June 5, 1989, at 245, 254.
115. McLoughlin, supra note 111, at 7.
116. Id.
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Fifth, the United States has undertaken a variety of technology
policy initiatives. Other noteworthy federal initiatives include the
creation of the annual Malcom Baldridge Quality Award,"1 7 the ele-
vation of the National Science Advisor to the Assistant to the Presi-
dent for Science and Technology Policy,1 ' and the establishment of
the Advanced Technology Program (ATP) within the DoC." 9
III. LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
In 1992, the United States is at a technology policy crossroads.
Free market advocates argue that government has no role in tech-
nology and industry as a venture capitalist, believing that such a
role will only result in supporting dying industries. Private sector
plans envision a partnership between government and business with
government taking the lead in the early stages where business is
unable to maintain long term funding. The U.S. government has
taken tentative steps toward adopting an industrial and technology
policy by formulating lists of critical technologies. Nevertheless, in
the face of a lagging economy, it is evident that some action beyond
list-making is necessary. This section explains the alternative view-
points of free market advocates, and private sector planners.
A. Free Market Position
Since the birth of this country, an ongoing debate has existed
over whether the federal government should formulate an industrial
policy and play an active role in it.120 Indeed, the debate can be
dated to the disagreements between Alexander Hamilton and
Thomas Jefferson. 2' The mercantilism of Hamilton, denounced by
Jefferson, advocated "protectionist tariffs, bounties, and premiums
to nurture its infant industries."' 22 Since that time, the free market
position has been the federal government's stated policy, but as the
industrial and technological sector weakens, these free marketers
are finding it necessary to defend their position and decry the perils
of a national industrial policy.'23
Free market advocates take the view that the federal govern-
ment should not get involved in promoting the commercialization
117. COUNCIL ON COMPETrIVENESS, supra note 14, at 17.
118. Id.
119. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5131,
102 Stat. 1107, 1439-41 (1988); see also 15 U.S.C. § 278n (1988).
120. Industrial Policy: Is it the answer?, Bus. WK., July 4, 1983, at 54, 54.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See id.
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of technology.124 Specifically, they assert that any type of industrial
policy will stifle economic growth, slow down the shift of resources
to productive industries by trying to shore up declining industries,
and waste money on "targeted growth" industries that may have no
commercial future.'25 An industrial policy would also create many
layers of bureaucrats who will tinker with planning, bailouts, and
loan guarantees.
126
One of the main objectives of the free market advocates to an
industrial policy focuses on politicization. Free marketers assert
that Congress will not invest any group with authority to make pol-
icy because the new administrative body would cut into the prerog-
atives of the professional politicians. Politicians are greatly
influenced by the entrenched management of big industries and in-
terest groups who "will manipulate any industrial policy to promote
their own interests rather than those of the whole country."'
1 27
Many free market advocates vow that the government as entrepre-
neur is destined for failure. 128 They point to the government's su-
pervision of the railroads into bankruptcy, regulatory destruction of
interurban transportation, and regulation of thousands of banks out
of existence in the 1930s.129
One of the key advocates of the free market position is Charles
L. Schultze, former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
under President Jimmy Carter.131 Schultze claims that the phrase
"industrial policy" refers to "a loose collection of similar diagnoses
and proposals" that rely on two explicit propositions: (1) "the U.S.
has been de-industrializing;" and (2) "some other countries - Japan
being the preeminent example - have developed governmental poli-
cies that successfully promote vigorous industrial growth."'' Ac-
cording to Schultze, the need for industrial policy rests upon two
implicit propositions: (1) "the government [possesses] the analytical
capability to determine with greater success than market forces
what industrial structure is appropriate, who the potential winners
are, which of the losers should be saved, and how they should be
restructured;" and (2) "the American political system [can] make
124. See id. at 57.
125. Industrial Policy, supra note 120, at 57.
126. Id.
127. Gary S. Becker, The Best Industrial Policy is None at All, Bus. WK., August 5,
1985, at 14, 14.
128. See Industrial Policy, supra note 120, at 57.
129. Id.
130. Charles L. Schultze, Industrial Policy: A Dissent, THE BROOKINOS REV., Fall 1983,
at 3, 3.
131. Id. at 3-4.
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such critical choices among firms, individuals, and regions on the
basis of economic criteria rather than political pressures." 132
Schultze concludes that none of these propositions reflect real-
ity.133 "America has not been de-industrializing." 134  Although
economic performance has faltered at times, relative to the indus-
tries of other countries, U.S. industry has performed well by most
standards.1 35 Schultze maintains that there is no evidence that the
sharp decline in productivity growth "stems from a tendency for the
private market system to allocate investment to the 'wrong' places[,]
away from the manufacturing sector or, within manufacturing, to
the wrong firms or industries. 136  .
Examining the flourishing of the post-war Japanese economy,
Schultze downplays the role of industrial policy under the leader-
ship of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI).137
He asserts that the "huge savings rate, aggressive business leaders,
and... backlog of modem technology waiting to be exploited" are
the main reasons that Japan has prospered.1 38 Outside of Japan, the
failures of industrial policy are more evident; the Concorde in
France and Britain, 139 and the French state-sponsored computer
grant to the French company Groupe Bull SA 14 "are examples of
costly, futile government investments in [R&D]."1 41
Schultze flatly concludes that it is impossible to plan a success-
ful industrial structure 42 because "a set of economic criteria that
determine what gives different countries preeminence in particular
lines of business" simply does not exist.1 43 Also, the American
political system was not designed to bring order and authority
needed by an industrial policy, but to "constrain legislative and ex-
ecutive authorities so that they could not make arbitrary and invidi-
ous choices among individuals" and groups. 1" If attempted, the
end result would be misallocated resources, reduced industrial effi-
132. Id. at 4.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Schultze, supra note 130, at 4.
136. Id. at 6.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 7.
139. Industrial Policy, supra note 120, at 61.
140. Michael Schrage, Lessons in How Not To Develop an Industrial Policy, WASH. POST,
April 5, 1991, at F3.
141. Industrial Policy, supra note 120, at 61.
142. Schultze, supra note 130, at 9.
143. Id. at 7.
144. Id. at 10.
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ciency incentives, and blunted competitive forces.' 45
For the free market believers, any industrial policy will be re-
duced to the government picking winners and losers.'46 They em-
phasize government's present inability to be effective through its
"patchwork mess" of "existing tax policy, antitrust regulation, and
all the other elements which have become a kind of de facto indus-
trial policy."147 For them, "American grit and determination" will
be the force that drives U.S. industry, not government policy.148
Despite the naysayers, the beginnings of a national industrial
policy for the 1990s are becoming visible. This section next ana-
lyzes (1) private sector plans offered by the Council on Competi-
tiveness and the Carnegie Commission, (2) governmental efforts
focusing on efforts by the DoD, DoC, and the National Critical
Technologies Panel to identify critical technologies and (3) more far
reaching Congressional proposals for governmental involvement.
B. Private Sector Plans
Two private organizations that have greatly influenced govern-
mental policymakers to reevaluate the role of the public sector in
helping U.S. industry are the Council on Competitiveness and the
Carnegie Commission. These two diverse and well-respected
groups have focused attention on critical problems that face this
nation's industries.
1. Council on Competitiveness
In 1986, John Young, CEO of Hewlett-Packard, founded the
Council on Competitiveness as a non-profit, nonpartisan organiza-
tion of chief executives from business, higher education and organ-
ized labor. The Council's goal focuses on improving the ability of
American companies to compete effectively in world markets. The
Council has a three part agenda: to increase public awareness of the
breadth and severity of America's economic problems; to mobilize
the political will required to set the United States on a new and
positive economic course; and to assist in the development of spe-
cific public policies and private initiatives. "' The Council's policy
positions are based on the assumption that improving competitive-
145. Id.
146. John S. McClenahen, Now Do We Need a National Industrial Policy?, INDUSTRY
WK., March 18, 1991, at 56, 57.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 58.
149. COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 14.
[Vol. 9
DEVELOPING CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES
ness will only occur through a series of incremental steps that in-
volve all sectors, including business, labor, academia, and
government. The Council has issued a series of pragmatic, action-
oriented recommendations upon which practical policies can be
built.
One of the Council's first reports, America's Competitive Crisis:
Confronting the New Reality,150 played an important role in struc-
turing the initial competitiveness debate. The Council continued its
study of the competitiveness crisis with Picking Up the Pace: The
Commercial Challenge to American Innovation.15 1 This report dis-
cussed how and to what extent America's once commanding tech-
nological lead has disappeared. Its policy recommendations
address ways the federal government can facilitate the commerciali-
zation of technology.
The Council made four broad recommendations in Picking Up
the Pace, each addressing a key policy issue." 2 First, "the federal
government should improve the macroeconomic environment that
affects the private sector's ability to develop and apply technol-
ogy."115 3 Such an improvement could be made by making "fiscal
policy more supportive of private sector efforts to commercialize
technology" and by strengthening U.S. trade policy for technol-
ogy.1 54 Fiscal policy should be directed at credible multi-year deficit
reduction and the promotion of savings and long term invest-
ment.15 ' Trade policy should focus on opening foreign high-tech-
nology markets and improving protection of intellectual property
abroad. 156
Second, the Council recommended that "the federal govern-
ment should improve the machinery for making technology pol-
icy."'1 57 Specifically, an Assistant to the President for Science and
Technology should be appointed as a cabinet level position.
158
Technology policy should also "rationalize the involvement of Con-
gress in technology-related issues" by making R&D tax provisions
consistent, increasing "funding for government agencies that con-
tribute to the commercial application of technology," and creating
150. COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AMERICA'S COMPETITIVENESS CRISIS: CON-
FRONTING THE NEw REALITY (1987).
151. COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 17.
152. Id. at 4-7.
153. Id. at 4.
154. COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 17.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
1993]
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGYL4WJOURTAL
"a legal and regulatory environment more conducive to the com-
mercial application of technology."'5'
9
Third, the Council recommended that "the federal government
should increase its investment in the education, facilities and equip-
ment that constitute the nation's technological infrastructure" by
initiating a faculty-development program for science and engineer-
ing and modernizing university research facilities with a $10 billion
dollar program. 160
Fourth, the Council concluded by recommending that "the
federal government... widen the focus of national research and
development efforts."' 16 Specifically, the Council indicated that the
federal government should re-evaluate "the agenda and purpose of
the federal laboratories and their relationship with industry," facili-
tate "cooperative generic manufacturing technology," improve
"federal coordination with state technology programs," and en-
courage Defense Department efforts to strengthen the U.S. indus-
trial base. 6
In March, 1991, the Council published Gaining New Ground:
Technology Priorities for America's Future.1 63 This report repre-
sents a pioneering effort to examine the U.S. strategic technology
needs for the 1990s. The report identifies, on a sector by sector
basis, strategic industrial priorities in science and technology. The
Council worked closely with senior technology experts from nine
sectors of U.S. industry to identify the technologies deemed critical
to each industry.161 The Council verified the list of critical technol-
ogies with leading executives from universities, labor unions, and
other specialists. 16 The analysis of each sector focused on the sec-
tor's competitive position, the technologies that are important to it,
how it develops and uses technology, its performance in developing
technology, and the factors supporting and inhibiting its technology
development. 166 As a result of this exhaustive analysis, the Council
determined the critical technologies that need to be developed and
assessed the impact of government policies on the various sectors'
competitiveness. The Council compiled the findings and made pol-
159. COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 17, at 5-6.
160. Id. at 6-7.
161. Id. at 7.
162. Id.
163. COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 14.
164. Id. at i.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 55.
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icy recommendations to the government on how to better facilitate
technology development in the nation.
In its March 1991 report, the Council listed six key findings:
1) "there [exists] a broad domestic and international consensus
about the critical generic technologies driving economic growth
and competitiveness;"' 167
2) "the U.S. position in many critical technologies is slipping
and, in some cases, has been lost altogether[,]" with future trends
not looking encouraging; 6 '
3) "foreign governments are systematically pursuing leadership
in critical technologies;"'169
4) "U.S. public policy does not adequately support American
leadership in [these] technologies, and U.S. national priorities do
not sufficiently address issues related to the role of technology in
U.S. competitiveness;"' 170
5) "most of the technologies that will drive economic growth
over the next decade already exist, and industry needs to improve
its ability to convert them into marketable products and
servics;'
17 1
6) "America's research universities constitute a great national
asset, but their focus on technology and competitiveness is
imited;" 172
Based upon these findings, the 1991 report concluded that "in order
to create quality jobs, generate strong economic growth and safe-
guard national security, the U.S. government and private sector
should work together to develop coherent policies to ensure U.S.
leadership in the development, use and commercialization of
technology."' 17
3
The Council recommended that the President make technology
leadership a national priority in order to enhance U.S. economic
competitiveness. 74 The Council asserted that the federal and state
governments should "develop policies and implement programs to
ensure that America has a world-class technology infrastruc-
ture." 17 1 In addition, because technological advancements require
vigorous private sector efforts, the Council argued that "U.S. indus-
167. Id. at 1.
168. COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 14, at 2.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 3.
172. Id.
173. COUNCIL ON COMPETIVENESS, supra note 14, at 3.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 4.
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try should establish more effective technology networks to help it
compete in the international marketplace."' 76 The Council further
argued that "U.S. firms should set a goal to meet and surpass the
best commercialization practices of their competitors."' 77 Finally,
the Council recommended that, "while keeping their basic research
programs strong, universities should develop closer ties to industry
so that education and research programs contribute more effectively
to the real.., needs of the manufacturing and service sectors."' 178
2. The Carnegie Commission
In 1988, the Carnegie Corporation of New York created the
Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government. 179
The Commission's purpose focuses on helping government institu-
tions respond to advances in science and technology and seek out
ways to make this relationship more effective.' 80
In September, 1991, the Commission published Technology
and Economic Performance: Organizing the Executive Branch for a
Stronger National Technology Base,' a "how-to" manual for the
government to provide better support for technology develop-
ment. "2 While emphasizing that the primary responsibility for the
advancement of commercial technology rests with private industry,
the Commission called for a greater federal role in supporting "ge-
neric" technologies that contribute to both commercial and military
uses. '3 Through this report, the Commission attempts to provide
the executive branch with some "first steps" toward implementing a
technology poliey.' 84
The Commission offered four specific proposals. First, the
Commission recommended the transformation of DARPA into
NARPA, the National Advanced Research Projects Agency.18 5
The "renamed agency would focus more on dual-use technolog[ies],
those technologies that are useful both in defense and commercial
176. Id. at 5.
177. Id.
178. COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 14, at 6.
179. Council on Competitiveness, Technology Policy: Blueprint Provided for Government,
CHALLENGES, October 1991, at 1, 4 [hereinafter Technology Policy].
180. Id.
181. CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND GOVERNMENT, TECH-
NOLOGY AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: ORGANIZING THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH FOR A
STRONGER NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY BASE (1991) [hereinafter CARNEGIE COMMISSION].
182. Technology Policy, supra note 179, at 1.
183. Id. at 1, 4; see also CARNEGIE COMMISSION, supra note 181, at 6.
184. Technology Policy, supra note 179, at 4.
185. Id.; see also CARNEGIE COMMISSION, supra note 181, at 7.
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markets." 18 6 Because defense budgets are likely to decrease during
the 1990s, NARPA would have to collaborate extensively with
commercial industry. 18 7 The agency would still support purely mil-
itary technologies, but it would also enter into cooperative ventures
and develop techniques for commercial diffusion of technology.'88
Second, the Commission suggested designating the President's
Office of Science and Technology Policy "as the focal point for iden-
tifying and formulating technology policy issues." 18 9 The Office of
Science and Technology Policy, the Commission concluded, should
also provide support for technology program development and
evaluation.190
Third, the Commission concluded that the National Security
Council should take the lead within the executive branch "in coor-
dinating and integrating the various policy perspectives on matters
that link national security, economic performance and technology
strength."19 1
Fourth, within the Commerce Department, NIST "would have
the central responsibility for supporting pre-competitive, generic re-
search and development not within the purview of other govern-
ment agencies or departments."' 1
92
These two private groups, the Council on Competitiveness and
the Carnegie Commission, have taken the lead in propelling the fed-
eral government into action. In their reports, they focused on the
deteriorating areas of U.S. competitiveness and suggested ways to
change the current course. The alarm that these groups sounded
led the government to begin to study the problems. This eventually
resulted in reports by the Department of Defense, the Department
of Commerce and the National Critical Technologies Panel.
C. Government Plans
Efforts in the early 1980s to cut back the role of government
resulted from the widespread view that strong government and effi-
186. Technology Policy, supra note 179, at 4; see also CARNEGIE COMMIssION, supra note
181, at 40.
187. Technology Policy, supra note 179, at 4; see also CARNEGIE COMMISSION, supra note
181, at 40.
188. Technology Policy, supra note 179, at 4; see also CARNEGIE COMMISSION, supra note
181 at 40.
189. Technology Policy, supra note 179, at 4; see also CARNEGIE COMMISSION, supra note
181, at 25.
190. Technology Policy, supra note 179, at 4; see also CARNEGIE COMMISSION, supra note
181, at 25.
191. Technology Policy, supra note 179, at 4.
192. Id.; see also CARNEGIE COMMISSION, supra note 181, at 7.
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cient private business are adversaries. 193 After ten years of de-
creased market share, lower educational performance, and declining
productivity, many have realized that cutting back on government
intervention may have not helped U.S. industry. In short, a need
exists to reinvest and refocus government's involvement in business
and technology.
Beginning in the late 1980s, this view of a new role for govern-
ment found fruition in the concept of critical technologies. The ad-
vocates of massive federal funding for commercial R&D put
pressure on the government to help U.S. firms improve their ability
to reach out and bring technology to the market rapidly. Govern-
ment already spends $70 billion a year on science and technology,
but as noted, the foc, has been mostly military. In the past, com-
mercial industries were able to rely on defense spinoffs, but that is
no longer feasible. The supporters of a technology policy want to
shift federal spending from defense to commercial applications,
change the mission of national laboratories from defense to indus-
trial technology, have the President make competitiveness a top pri-
ority, and increase efforts to spread advanced manufacturing
methods to all U.S. firms. 19 4
In 1988, the government, through the Defense Department,
took its first step in becoming involved in facilitating the develop-
ment of critical technology. Since that year, the Department of
Commerce and the National Critical Technologies Panel, along
with the President's Office of Science and Technology Policy, have
also developed critical technologies reports. Each report reviews the
current situation, future trends, and makes suggestions on the direc-
tion both government and industry should take.
The aim of governmental intervention in critical technologies is
to increase U.S. competitiveness. The Bush administration is not
advocating an industrial policy, but is supporting pre-competitive,
generic technology. 195
1. Department of Defense
Since 1989, the Department of Defense has released annual
critical technologies plans.1 96 The purpose of these reports is to
193. See Robert Kuttner, Why Business Needs a Stronger - and Wiser - Uncle Sam, Bus.
Wic., June 3, 1991, at 16, 16.
194. Id.
195. Bush Science Aide Issues a Statement to Quell Criticism, WALL ST. J., May 17,
1991, at All.
196. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES PLAN ES-I (1989).
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identify the technologies that will maintain U.S. military superior-
ity.197 These reports also attempt to provide guidelines for long
term investment planning. 198 Examining the progression of the
plans, it is evident that the amount of information and participation
has drastically increased. These plans were the first plans mandated
by Congress that focus primarily on critical technologies.
In response to the requirements contained in the National De-
fense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989,199" the DoD released its
first Critical Technologies Plan in March,' 1989.20 The Act re-
quired the Defense Department, with the assistance of the Depart-
ment of Energy, to annually provide Congress with a critical
technology plan.2 ' According to Congress, critical technologies
are "'the technologies most essential to develop in order to ensure
the long term qualitative superiority of the United States weapon
system.' ,,202
The Department of Defense's 1989 report contained considera-
ble information about the procedural aspects of formulating the
plan.203 The plan resulted from a series of meetings involving repre-
sentatives of the Department of Defense, the Department of En-
ergy, and the agencies within these departments responsible for
science and technology programs.
In the 1989 report, the DoD defined critical technologies as
"technologies with great promise of ensuring the long-term superi-
ority of the United States weapon systems. ' 205 Nuclear weapons
were purposely excluded.20 6 The report emphasized that the mere
promotion of critical technologies will not suffice; critical technolo-
gies must be "integrated into a balanced science and technology
program.) 20 7
The Department of Defense already had a science and technol-
ogy (S&T) investment strategy which shared and continues to share
the same objectives as the Critical Technologies Plan, namely, plan-
197. See id.
198. See id. at ES-2.
199. National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-456, 102
Stat. 1918 (1988).
200. U.S. DEPARTMENT oF DEFENSE, supra note 196, at I.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1.
203. Id. at 2-3.
204. Id. at 1.
205. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, supra note 196, at ES-1.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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ning technology to meet defense needs.20  The difference is that the
Critical Technologies Plan focuses on the "star performers" while
the S&T investment strategy takes into account the "whole
team."2"9 The Critical Technologies Plan, however, emphasized
that stability and perseverance in the overall program are vital to
ensure yearly improvements.210
The 1989 Plan selected twenty-two critical technologies211
based upon their potential in the performance and quality design
criteria.212 Under the performance criteria, critical technologies
must either "enhance performance of conventional weapons sys-
tems" or "provide new military capabilities. ' 213 Under the quality
design criteria, critical technologies must either "improve weapon
systems availability and dependability" or "improve weapon sys-
tems affordability. 214
Some of the critical technologies chosen have high potential for
rewards, but are also high risk.215 To reduce this risk, the 1989
report recommended that a technology in its conceptual stage fol-
low several alternative approaches.2" 6 At the "proof-of-feasibility"
stage, the most promising approaches can be identified and future
development options can be narrowed.21 7 While at the "demonstra-
tion" stage of development, a particular approach can be brought to
the point of transitioning into a system.218
In the Department's overall assessment, the 1989 report con-
cluded that the then present defense programs emphasized direct
support of research and development in universities and indus-
tries.219 The 1989 report optimistically maintained that, as of 1989,
the United States continued to be the world leader in technological
208. Id. at ES-2.
209. Id.
210. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, supra note 196, at ES-2.
211. Id. at ES-I, ES-2. The technologies were: Microelectronic Circuits and Their
Fabrication, Preparation of GaAs and Other Compound Semi-Conductors, Software
Producibility, Parallel Computer Architectures, Machine Intelligence/Robotics, Simulation
and Modeling, Integrated Optics, Fiber Optics, Sensitive Radars, Passive Sensors, Automatic
Target Recognition, Phased Arrays, Data Fusion, Signature Control, Computational Fluid
Dynamics, Air Breathing Propulsion, High Power Microwaves, Pulsed Power, Hypervelocity
Projectiles, High-Temperature/High-Strength/Light-Weight Composite Materials, Super-
conductivity, and Biotechnology Materials and Processing. Id.
212. Id. at 5.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, supra note 196, at 2.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 9.
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development, but conceded that in key niches of technology, other
countries were aggressively moving ahead.220
The 1990 Defense Department Critical Technologies Plan,221
required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Years 1990 and 1991222 expanded upon the 1989 plan. The 1990
plan was prepared by a group chaired by the Secretary of Defense
with representatives from, among others, the Army, Navy, Air
Force, DARPA, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Department
of Energy (DoE), and the National Laboratories in Los Alamo,
Livermore, and Sandia.223
The 1990 Plan reduced the number of critical technologies
from twenty-two to twenty.224 From the 1989 Plan's list, fifteen
titles remained the same, two technologies (integrated optics and
fiber optics) were combined under one title, two titles (high power
microwaves and phased arrays) were removed, although aspects of
these were included under pulsed power, signal processing, and sen-
sitive radars, and two new technologies (high energy density materi-
als and weapon system environment) were introduced.225
In choosing critical technologies, the 1990 report enlarged the
selection criteria, adding "multiple use. ' ' 226 Under multiple use cri-
teria, the technologies were judged on their "pervasiveness in major
weapon systems" and their "strengthening [of] the industrial
base.
227
The 1990 Plan prioritized the twenty critical technologies into
three categories. 2 28  Group A consisted of technologies that were
the most pervasive and judged to be of top priority.229 Included in
group A were composite materials, computational fluid dynamics,
220. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, supra note 196, at 10.
221. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES PLAN
(1990).
222. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, Pub. L. No.
101-189, see 842, § 2508, 103 Stat. 1352, 1512-14 (1989).
223. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, supra note 196, at 1.
224. Id. at ES-1. The technologies were: Semiconductor Materials and Microelectronic
Circuits, Software Producibility, Parallel Computer Architectures, Machine Intelligence and
Robotics, Simulation and Modeling, Photonics, Sensitive Radars, Passive Sensors, Signal
Processing, Signature Control, Weapon System Environment, Data Fusion, Computational
Fluid Dynamics, Air-Breathing Propulsion, Pulsed Power, Hypervelocity Projectiles, High
Energy Density Materials, Composite Materials, Superconductivity, and Biotechnology
Materials and Processes. Id.
225. Id. at 6.
226. Id. at 5. The 1989 selection criteria were performance and quality design. See
supra note 137 and accompanying text.
227. Id.
228. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, supra note 196, at 6.
229. Id. at 6-7.
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data fusion, passive sensors, photonics, semiconductor materials
and microelectronic circuits, signal processing and software
producibility.230
Group B included "enabling technologies [that] offer[ed] the
most immediate advances in weapon systems capabilities., 23 1 In-
cluded in group B were air-breathing propulsion, machine intelli-
gence and robotics, parallel computer architectures, sensitive
radars, signature control, simulation and modeling and weapon sys-
tem environment.232
Selected for Group C were "principally emerging technologies
whose applications [were] farthest in the future and most difficult to
identify in detail.' 23 3 Included in group C were biotechnology
materials and processes, high-energy density materials, hyper-
velocity projectiles, pulsed power and superconductivity.234
The 1991 Critical Technologies Plan231 was more comprehen-
sive than earlier plans. Congressional mandaie required the Plan to
outline the twenty-one technologies236 and to document funding
levels necessary for the advancement of each technology.237 The
1991 Plan represented an increased level of participation with input
from DoE, DoC, National Science Foundation, and other interested
private sector groups, including the Aerospace Industries Associa-
tion, the Electronic Industries Association, and the National Secur-
ity Industrial Assobiation. 238 The Plan also included a 1992 budget
request and a proposed five year budget with $232 million for
DARPA to pursue technology objectives. The report formulated a
"twenty-year view" for the DoD to provide for orderly, evolution-
ary improvements in weapon systems, generate innovative, highly
leveraged breakthrough technologies and insert them into our mili-
230. Id. at 7.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, supra note 196, at 7.
234. Id.
235. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES PLAN
(1991).
236. Id. at 1-3. The technologies chosen were: Semiconductor Materials and Microelec-
tronic Circuits, Software Engineering, High Performance Computing, Machine Intelligence
and Robotics, Simulation and Modeling, Photonics, Sensitive Radar, Passive Sensors, Signal
and Image Processing, Signature Control, Weapon System Environment, Data Fusion, Com-
putational Fluid Dynamics, Air Breathing Propulsion, Pulsed Power, Hypervelocity Projec-
tiles and Propulsion, High Energy Density Materials, Composite Materials, Superconductiv-
ity, Biotechnology, and Flexible Manufacturing. Id.
237. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1990 and 1991 sec 605, § 2508,
103 Stat. at 1512-13.
238. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, supra note 196, at 1-1.
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tary capability, and seek technological "trump cards" to sustain
long-term dominance in the technological arms race.2 39 The 1991
report also contained what the Department called "themes" which
were really broad goals such as producing quality products at an
affordable cost, modernizing the Research, Development, Testing
and Evaluation (RDT&E) establishment, and radically accelerating
the development and use of flexible manufacturing and training
technology.2 °
The 1991 report contained brief descriptions of each of the
twenty-one critical technologies, its applications, and future poten-
tial.24 The list of technologies changed little from the previous
year. The 1991 Plan differs from the 1990 Plan in that it makes no
effort to explicitly assign higher or lower priorities to any of the
critical technologies.242
The 1991 report placed twenty-one critical technologies into
five clusters:
(1) computing/information,
(2) sensing,
(3) materials and manufacturing,
(4) energy and material flow management, and
(5) infrastructure.
The 1991 report used the cluster approach to demonstrate the high
degree of technological interdependence. 243
The 1991 report was the first defense report which emphasized
dual-use technologies, noting that only six of the listed critical tech-
nologies were military-specific technologies. 2' The remaining fif-
teen technologies have significant commercial application or
potential in addition to their military significance.245
The 1989, 1990 and 1991 Critical Technologies Plans estab-
lished a consistent need for development of certain technologies for
military superiority. The progression of the plans demonstrate a
widening focus, concentrating not only on military use, but also on
commercial potential. These plans represent a pioneering Federal
government effort toward identifying critical technologies.
239. Id. at HI-1.
240. Id. at HI-2.
241. Id. at III-1 - 111-21.
242. DoD Lists 21 Critical Technologies, includes Flexible Manufacturing, Bureau of Na-
tional Affairs, April 8, 1991, at A16.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
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2. Department of Commerce (DoC)
In the spring of 1990, the Technology Administration within
the Department of Commerce published Emerging Technologies, A
Survey of Technological and Economic Opportunities.246 The report
sought to "provide a source of information to be used by industry,
government and academia as programs and policies are developed
to exploit new, emerging technologies. 247
The DoC report defined an emerging technology as one having
"a high probability of techn[ological] success for new products and
applications that might have substantial markets within approxi-
mately ten years."" An emerging technology might also considera-
bly advance the quality of goods produced by existing industries
that supply major markets.249
The report identified twelve emerging technologies.250 These
emerging technologies were divided into four categories: 1) materi-
als (advanced materials and superconductors); 2) electronic and in-
formation systems (advanced semiconductor devices, digital
imaging technology, high-density data storage, high-performance
computing, and optoelectronics); 3) manufacturing systems (artifi-
cial intelligence, flexible computer-integrated manufacturing, and
sensor technology); and 4) life-sciences applications (biotechnology
and medical devises and diagnostics).251
The report contained information on areas for future govern-
ment technological leadership, 252 areas for government-industry co-
operation,253 and comparisons with Japan and the European
Community.254 The report also focused on areas where opportuni-
ties existed to modify the business, educational and governmental
environments so as to lower barriers to the effective development
and commercialization of emerging technologies.2 55 The report of-
246. TECHNOLOGY ADMINISTRATION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,
EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES: A SURVEY OF TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES
(1990).
247. Id. at 3.
248. Id. at 5.
249. Id. at iii.
250. Id. at 9. The technologies were: Advanced Materials, Superconductors, Advanced
Semiconductor Devises, Digital Imaging Technology, High-Density Data Storage, High-Per-
formance Computing, Optoelectronics, Artificial Intelligence, Flexible Computer-Integrated
Manufacturing, Sensor Technology, Biotechnology, and Medical Devises and Diagnostics.
Id.
251. TECHNOLOGY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 246, at 9.
252. Id. at xv.
253. Id. at xvii-xix.
254. Id. at ix-xii.
255. Id. at 15-24.
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fered thirteen conclusions with respect to modifying the environ-
ment so as to promote emerging technologies:
(i) lowering the cost of research and market introduction;
(ii) improving engineering training and education;
(iii) integrating R&D, design, and manufacturing;
(iv) improving the quality of products and services;
(v) improving the technology infrastructure;
(vi) emphasizing the adoption of international standards;
(vii) accepting technological innovation from abroad;
(viii) increasing U.S. industrial cooperation;
(ix) encouraging protection of intellectual property rights;
(x) enacting uniform and limited product liability laws;
(xi) reducing regulatory constraints;
(xii) removing restrictions on export policy; and
(xiii) removing restrictive foreign trade practices.256
The DoC report addressed the failure of U.S. industry to cap-
ture the majority of benefits from emerging technologies.257 Since
there is a strong interest in all sectors of the economy to take action
to improve U.S. competitiveness, drafters of the report hoped the
document would be used as a tool in pursuit of that goal.25 8 Specifi-
cally, DoC hoped the report would start a dialogue among industry,
labor, academia, and government which would lead to concerted
actions to improve U.S. competitiveness and strengthen U.S. sci-
ence and technology options.259
3. National Critical Technologies Panel (NCTP)
The National Science and Technology Policy, Organization,
and Priorities Act of 1976 established the Office of Science and
Technology Policy within the Executive Branch of the U.S. govern-
ment.2 6 The Director of the Office of Science and Technology Pol-
icy also serves as the President's personal science advisor.
261
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990
and 1991 established a National Critical Technologies Panel within
the Office of Science and Technology Policy.2 62 The Panel consists
of thirteen members who are required to prepare a biennial re-
256. TECHNOLOGY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 246, at 15-24.
257. Id. at 25.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-282, § 201, 90 Stat. 459, 463 (1976) (codified at 42 U.S.C § 6601, 6611).
261. Id. at § 204, 42 U.S.C. § 6613.
262. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, Pub. L. No.
101-189, § 601-5, 103 Stat. at 1511-12 (1989)(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6681-85).
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port. 26 3 The Director of the Office of Science and Technology Pol-
icy appoints nine members, three from the federal government and
the remaining six from private industry and higher education. 2
The Secretaries of Defense, Energy and Commerce each appoint
one member, and the Administrator of the National Aeronautic and
Space Administration appoints the remaining member, for a total of
thirteen.265 The Act authorizes the Panel to identify product and
process technologies, not to exceed thirty, which they consider to be
technologies that are essential to the further development of the
long term national security and economic prosperity of the U.S. 266
In preparing its March, 1991 report, the Panel reviewed recent
studies on critical technologies, had briefings with various organiza-
tions that have examined the issues, such as the Council on Com-
petitiveness, the National Academy of Engineering, and the
National Academy of Sciences, screened a number of technologies
against a set of criteria, and placed the selected technologies within
a hierarchy which highlighted the interrelationships among
them. 267 The criteria used for selection by the Panel consisted of
national needs, importance/criticality, and market size/diversity.268
The Panel selected twenty-two technologies 269 from over one
hundred nominees.270 These technologies were divided into six
broad areas: materials; manufacturing; information and communi-
cations; biotechnology and life sciences; aeronautics and surface
transportation; and energy and the environment.27 In comparing
the critical technologies chosen by the National Critical Technolo-
gies Panel with those chosen by the DoC as emerging technologies,
all were the same, -except the DoC added technologies in the areas
263. Id. at § 601-602, 42 U.S.C. § 6681-82.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at § 603, 42 U.S.C. § 6683.
267. NATIONAL CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES PANEL, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CRITI-
CAL TECHNOLOGIES PANEL 122 (1991).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 3. The technologies chosen were: Materials Synthesis and Processing, Elec-
tronic and Photonic Materials, Ceramics, Composites, High-Performance Metals and Alloys,
Flexible Computer Integrated Manufacturing, Intelligent Processing Equipment, Micro-and
Nanofabrication, Systems Management Technologies, Software, Microelectronics and
Optoelectronics, High-Performance Computing and Networking, High-Definition Imaging
and Displays, Sensors and Signal Processing, Data Storage and Peripherals, Computer Simu-
lation and Modeling, Applied Molecular Biology, Medical Technology, Aeronautics, Surface
Transportation Technologies, Pollution Minimization, Remediation and Waste Management,
and Energy Technologies. Id.
270. Id. at 2.
271. Id.
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of aeronautics, surface transportation, and energy and the
environment.272
The Panel's report described each technology and highlighted
the reasons for selecting each technology, together with a notation
about its current status and emerging international trends.273
The Panel argued that the success of many firms rests on their
ability to bring associated products of generic technology to the
market swiftly. 274 By showing that it is not necessary for these
companies to be the discovers and developers of the latest innova-
tion, the panel illustrated the importance of integration and short
product cycles.275
The Panel concluded by challenging the U.S. to develop and
deploy technologies swiftly and strategically, but stressed that our
ability to reap benefits will depend upon the quality of our science
and mathematics education.2 76 No advances will be made without a
new generation of technologically literate workers.277 The Panel
further concluded that technology can be an important contribution
to U.S. defense superiority and economic prosperity, but only if the
country learns to utilize it more effectively.278
Although the Department of Defense, the Department of
Commerce and the National Critical Technologies Panel studies
differ, particularly in their scope, there is an extensive overlap
among them. The Defense reports concentrated on military ad-
vancement and the Commerce study focused on the commercial ap-
plications of some of the same technologies. The Panel used both
the Defense reports and the Commerce study as source material,
but added new areas. All of these reports had the purpose of identi-
fying critical technologies to help in the establishment of policy, but
none of these reports had any immediate legal or regulatory signifi-
cance. The reports merely laid the foundation for the action that
now must be taken.
4. Congressional Proposals
Many members of Congress remain dissatisfied with the efforts
of the Department of Defense, the Department of Commerce and
the Panel. One of the most outspoken is Senator Jeff Bingaman, (D.-
272. NATIONAL CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES PANEL, supra note 267, at 5.
273. Id. at 9-116.
274. Id. at 1.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 6.
277. NATIONAL CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES PANEL, supra note 267, at 6.
278. Id. at 2.
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N.M.) who heads the Senate Defense Industry and Technology Sub-
committee. Senator Bingaman criticized the National Critical
Technologies Panel report, saying that the level of progress by the
Administration had been marginal and that a number of critical
technologies had not received any funding.279 He also stressed that
after almost three years of list-making it was time to outline what
the government should do with respect to each of the technologies
to maintain or regain U.S. leadership.28 0
Senator Bingaman along with Senators Hollings (D.-S.C.),
Nunn (D.-Ga.), and Gore (D.-Tenn.) proposed four related bills
that would significantly increase and target federal spending to de-
velop generic technology helpful to U.S. industries. They cited the
numerous government and industry reports, particularly the Coun-
cil on Competitiveness' Gaining New Ground2"' as the inspiration
for these bills.
The first bill, the National Critical Technologies Act of 1991282
directs the Office of Science and Technology Policy to develop stra-
tegic road maps for critical technologies, 2 3 and authorizes more
funding for Defense, Commerce, and other departments that sup-
port partnerships to conduct high risk R&D.284 This bill would
also create regional critical technology application centers,28 5 and
improve the monitoring of foreign technological advances.286
The second bill, the Advanced Manufacturing Technology Act
of 1991287 would increase funding for R&D of manufacturing tech-
nology,288 create a manufacturing extension service,289 expand aid
for engineering and management education,290 and increase access
to foreign technology through international cooperation.291 The
bill also calls for "coordinated management of federal activities in
advanced manufacturing technology, with direct industry input into
that planning process."2 92
279. See George Leopold, Congress "Critical"List Lacks Strategy, DEF. NEWS, April 29,
1991, at 4.
280. Id.
281. COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 14.
282. S. 1327, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
283. Id. at § 101.
284. Id. at §§ 204, 221-24.
285. Id. at § 301.
286. Id. at § 404.
287. S. 1328, 102nd Cong., Ist Sess. (1991).
288. Id. at § 223.
289. Id. at § 302.
290. Id. at § 402.
291. Id. at § 501.
292. S. 1328, 102nd Cong., Ist Sess. 501 (1991).
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The third bill, the Manufacturing Strategy Act of 1991293 calls
for the Commerce Department to act as the leader in development
of generic manufacturing technology and require all agencies with
R&D budgets over $50 million to earmark one-half percentage to
development of new generic technology, except for Defense, En-
ergy, and the National Science Foundation because these agencies
already have well developed existing programs.294 The bill would
expand state technology extension programs, create a National
Quality Laboratory, and establish a twelve member National Com-
mission on Industrial Modernization.295
The fourth bill, the Federal Technology Strategy Act of
1991296 directs federal agencies to fund private industry projects
under the Commerce Department's Advanced Technology Pro-
gram,2 97 and requires the Commerce Secretary to submit a report
on private investment and commercialization of new technology.2 98
The Office of Science and Technology Policy would be required to
prepare a five year federal technology development plan.299
These bills attempt to further the government's involvement in
critical technologies. The thrust of the pending legislation primar-
ily focuses on allocating more funding for R&D and expanding pro-
grams within existing agencies or creating new programs and
centers in an effort to regain U.S. leadership in technology commer-
cialization of technology.
IV. CONCLUSION
The remaining question is where does the United States go
from here? A general consensus exists that the list-making process
is at its conclusion and that some type of action must be forthcom-
ing. One of the basic problems turns on coordinating the many
plans so that the best proposals of each are implemented by govern-
ment and industry.
In their effort to improve the commercialization of technol-
ogy, the federal government can also learn from successful state
programs. These programs have focused on linking the state's aca-
demic resources with its businesses, thereby improving technology
293. S. 1330, 102nd Cong., Ist Sess. (1991).
294. Id. at § 3.
295. Id.
296. S. 1329, 102nd Cong., Ist Sess. (1991).
297. Id. at § 3.
298. Id. at § 4.
299. Id. at § 3.
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transfer.3°°
One of the biggest obstacles the state programs have faced is
gaining accountability in the face of the prevailing sentiment that
government, whether federal or state, is incapable of making intelli-
gent investment decisions. The states which have successful pro-
grams, among them Pennsylvania and Ohio, faced an initial
struggle since they attempted to challenge the current economic de-
velopment thinking. As the economies of these rust belt states were
rapidly declining, it was necessary to develop new technologies to
replace dying industries, such as coal and steel. These state govern-
ments realized that it was necessary not only to bring in new indus-
tries but also to change existing patterns of investment and ideas
about government-industry cooperation.
In examining Pennsylvania's Ben Franklin Partnership, it is
evident that the state's goal was a successful transition from an in-
dustrial to a post-industrial economy. 30 1 The Partnership, named
after one of Pennsylvania's greatest entrepreneurs, was designed to
help business and academia work together to develop technologies
necessary to the state's economy. 302 Essentially a matching grant
program, its main success has centered on the creation of one of the
top intellectual infrastructures in the country.303 Pennsylvania, as
did other states with similar programs, struggled to gain acceptance
as it first implemented the program in 1988, but a little less than five
years later, its program has been successful in nurturing new high
tech companies, modernizing equipment, and creating high tech
jobs.3 4
The danger with all of these programs, either on the state or
federal level, is their potential to be politicized.30 5 As long as the
politicians do not interfere and let the science and technology ex-
perts decide which technologies should be developed, the programs
have a better chance of succeeding. 30 6 However, whether politiciza-
tion is truly a danger remains to be seen.
The phrase "industrial policy" has incited much debate. How-
ever, whether it is called industrial policy, a technology competi-
300. Laurent Belsie, Make a Better Bottle and People Will Beat a Path, THE CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONIrOR, April 26, 1990, at 7..
301. DAVID OSBORNE, LABORATORIES OF DEMOCRACY 45 (1988).
302. Id. at 48.
303. Id.
304. See Michael Schroeder, Small Business Has A Friend in Pennsylvania, Bus. WK.,
April 6, 1992, at 75, 75.
305. Belsie, supra note 300, at 7.
306. Id.
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tiveness plan, or something else, turning knowledge into new
technologies and products which will spur economic growth rests
on some type of comprehensive plan. Cutbacks in the large defense
budget have provided the opportunity for the federal government to
redirect these funds into civilian R&D funding and it is critical to
develop a plan.
Contrary to general belief, the federal government has played a
key role in the success of certain- industries.3" 7 Among these indus-
tries are railroads, farming, airlines, and electronics.30 The govern-
ment did not select these industries as "winning" industries; it
simply saw the importance of these industries to the national econ-
omy and used the government structure in the form of tax breaks
and land grants to aid in their development.30 9
Generally, agreement exists on the elements needed to create a
successful technology growth policy. First, federal spending on ci-
vilian R&D needs to be dramatically increased with the money allo-
cated spread over many ideas from basic research to new
manufacturing technologies. 1 Economic studies have documented
that the rate of return, both direct and indirect, from R&D can be
as high as 50% of the money spent, illustrating the importance of
continuing to explore new ideas.31I That return however, is usually
not immediate. Researchers are typically unable to predict the
technologies that will be developed from the basic research. Hence
government investment in basic research must be encouraged.
The second element in creating a successful technology policy
is to provide technical assistance to industry in order to diffuse new
technology to manufacturers, particularly the smaller ones.312 A
major problem faced by' American companies is their outdated
practices and equipment.313 To help these firms, the federal govern-
ment needs to increase funding for existing state technology exten-
sion centers and create more of these centers to handle the needs of
struggling manufacturers who have received little assistance.314
Another deteriorating, but important element is public infra-
307. Christopher Farrell & Michael G. Mandel, Industrial Policy - Call It What You
Will, The Nation Needs a Plan to Nurture Growth, Bus. WK., April 6, 1992, at 70, 70.
308. Id.
309. See id.
310. Id. at 70-72.
311. Id. at 72.
312. Farrel & Mandel, supra note 307, at 72-73.
313. Id. at 73.
314. Id.
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structure.315 In addition to making needed repair of roads, harbors,
and bridges, the federal government should build a communications
infrastructure to service the needs of "information-intensive" indus-
tries.316 Presently the federal government has not allocated enough
money to help private sector businesses develop an information sys-
tem that is able to transfer large amounts of data rapidly between
research centers and business.317 To do this, the government needs
to offer incentives to the telecommunications industry to construct
high-speed data links which will ensure that data is available to
small critical technology companies.318
Technology education is another fundamental element in the
nurturing of economic growth.319 Occupation choices of college
graduates affect the growth of the economy. Recent concern has
focused on poor performance of students in math and science at the
primary and secondary levels, as well as on the insufficient number
of graduating scientists and engineers.320 Increased numbers of
scientists and engineers increase the likelihood of new technology
and product development, thereby furthering economic growth.321
Many technology innovators will establish their own companies,
helping the economy by creating new jobs. 322 The federal govern-
ment can play a key role by subsidizing the higher education of
students pursuing science and engineering degrees and by improv-
ing basic education in science and math.323
Finally, the federal government should encourage investment
in new technologies by making the research and investment tax
credits permanent.324 The private sector should take the initiative
by changing the focus from short term profits to long range plan-
ning, but the government can improve the climate for investment
through the tax incentives.
The Council on Competitiveness's Gaining New Ground 325 ap-
pears to be the most comprehensive and influential plan. This
plan's strength derives from the fact that it addresses every sector of
the economy that must be involved, making recommendations with
315. Id. at 73-74.
316. Id. at 73.
317. Farrell & Mandel, supra note 307, at 74.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Farrell & Mandel, supra note 307, at 74.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
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respect to each.3 26 What makes this plan the most appealing is its
effort to effectuate widespread participation, ensuring that the most
important needs of the various sectors are considered in the formu-
lation of the plan. Although every sector, whether it be business,
labor, government, or academia, needs to improve, it appears to be
the federal government which has the most changes to make.
The federal government could undertake steps to restructure
parts of itself based on some of the initiatives implemented by suc-
cessful U.S. companies. Specifically, the federal government needs
to delegate authority, foster teamwork, pursue quality relentlessly,
and pay keen attention to its customers. The federal government
also needs to have a two year budget so that its many agencies have
a greater ability to plan for future spending.32 7
Another growing problem is the micromanagement by Con-
gress.328 Historically, the role of Congress was to help set the over-
all direction for the nation, but many view Congress today, as
meddling in the daily affairs of the executive agencies.329 A solution
lies in improving the consultative process and defusing the increas-
ingly heated partisan debates.330
A tendency exists in government to ignore problems, including
structural ones, that are not seen as urgent. Now, as U.S. industries
are faltering, the federal government finds itself unable and unpre-
pared to help. The federal government is not organized efficiently
to quickly assemble a qualified group of government agents to de-
velop a technology program to deal with the competitive crisis. The
plight of United States critical technologies must be a major na-
tional concern.
But creating economic growth is merely the first step. The ulti-
mate success will be achieved when the urban poor are brought into
the growth process through education and when they share in the
fruits of growth. If our industrial and technological base is to re-
main strong, knowledge must be passed down through our educa-
tional system, providing the foundation for technological leadership
in the United States for years to come.
326. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
327. David Kirkpatrick, It's Simply Not Working, FORTUNE, November 19, 1990, at
179, 180.
328. Id. at 182.
329. Id.
330. See Id.
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